Wednesday, November 30, 2011

Afghan quagmire hotting up in the chill

The very recent incident whereby a number of Pakistani soldiers were killed due to “friendly fire” incidents from the air strikes called by their erstwhile NATO allies from Afghanistan is not a unique but one in a list of events between the recent love-hate relationship involving US and Pakistan.

This incident follows the Raymond Davis affair in the beginning of the year when the CIA agent Raymond Davis gunned down two ISI operatives tailing him in broad daylight in Lahore. Then came the blockbuster of the year in May when Osama Bin Laden was killed by US Nave Seals in a rundown villa in Abottabad at the stone throwing distance from the Pakistani military headquarters.

This current incident comes just days after it was revealed through rumours that the Pakistani civilian leadership may well have sought American intervention in Pakistani domestic affairs following the Bin Laden killing. To be precise, for those who are experienced about US-Pakistani relationships, there is only one way it seems the relationships can go and that is downhill.

Pakistan is considered to be a very tough assignment for any Western diplomat now days. Pakistanis are very much like their Indian counterparts. Jovial, nice, worm, friendly and excellent to do business with as Mr. Nehru found them decades back. But when it comes to contentious issues involving their honor and interests, the Pakistanis can be as difficult and uncompromising as you can get.

In other words , a Pakistani will be “a friend of friends” when they see “eye to eye” , but if their perceived interests do not match with their negotiating partner , getting something done with them can be as difficult as getting Sara Palin to run as a running mate with Mr. Obama.

You can not blame the Pakistanis for being as uncompromising when it comes to protecting their core interests. As a young Pakistani army commander, diplomat or a politician, the first thing that you see on the map is a large and hostile neighbor from East and then another hostile and unstable neighbor from West.

Since Pakistan does not possess enough resources to fight two hostile situations at the same time it makes sense for them to concentrate at one front at one time. This is the reason Pakistan faced with a hostile India at the East and a chaotic post-Soviet Afghanistan on the West, choose to build ties with the Taliban to maintain a semblance of control at its Western border.

That approach worked well for them until the twin towers came crashing down and as a consequence Pakistanis found themselves sandwiched between two superpowers; the emerging Indian superpower and the existing American hyper powers.

The Pakistani leadership was in an existential crisis in those days following nine eleven. If they said no when President Bush asked them whether they are “with us or against us?”, Pakistanis risk being bombarded to stone ages.

The Pakistanis did what was politically correct at the time. They requested their friends in Taliban to melt away into the mountains, brush up the skills of sniping and shooting which Pashtun tribesmen have perfected over centuries in fighting to stave off the foreign aggressors and wait for an opportune time to come.

Fortunately for them, that opportune time came very soon when Americans, firmly in the grip of hubris and messianic fervor after their swift success of removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, decided to invade Iraq and as a consequence bogged down in that country.

This ensured the return of Taliban as a force viable enough to challenge the writ of America in Afghanistan. Pakistanis though out the American involvement have maintained ties with the Taliban to ensure that they can have the ears of their Taliban allies once America withdraws and the Taliban able to fill up the vacuum of a post-America Afghanistan. This was the long-term strategic picture of Afghanistan from Pakistani viewpoint and looking from their viewpoint they were justified in sticking to it despite strong objecttions from their American allies.

Things have changed in the relationship between Pakistanis and Americans since those days of “with us or against us?” History and geography ensures that. Pakistan is the transit country through which America has to bring the vast majority (49 % by some 2011 estimates) of her military supplies into Afghanistan. If Pakistan stops those transit routes through Chaman and Torkham then the American army runs the risk of losing her life lines.

There are very few alternative options for America to ponder. Afghanistan is land locked and there are only two countries with existing port facilities through which supplies can be brought into Afghanistan. One of them is Pakistan and another is Iran. But at this point of history, the relationship between Iran and America is similar to that of Cross and Count Dracula. Afghanistan’s central Asian neighbors have been approached by America in the past and there is an existing alternative route but that option is comparatively costlier to maintain. Another important thing to consider here about the continuing existence of that route depends upon America keeping good terms with Russia and China, something American leadership has not shown perfect willingness to do with recently.

That leaves America with very little options in reality if Pakistan really decides to draw red lines to America regarding American conduct in the region. This is something the Pakistani leadership has not done previously. In the case of past violations of its sovereignty, Pakistan have threatened to withdraw from the American venture but in the end relented considering American power in the region.

Now things have changed dramatically from a geo-political perspective in the region. America’s position in Eurasia is challenged by the rising power of China and the aspiring power Russia seeking to redeem her previous glory. Iran has not relented despite strong sanctions and pressure from America. Pakistan is a vital cog in the whole equation. The recent Istanbul conference on Afghanistan saw a consensus between China, Russia, Pakistan and Iran to thwart American plans for the region. So Pakistan can be secured of the fact that they will not face regional isolation once they burn their bridges with America.

This leaves America with very few options as Spengler points out in his weekly column in Asia times. One option will be to ask India, the arch-rival of Pakistan, to come into Afghanistan with active military support. This is one option the current Indian government will be extremely reluctant to even consider; India would not like to draw herself in a similar quagmire that America finds herself now in Afghanistan and India will not like to irk China and Russia for the sake of keeping America happy.

Another option will be, as Spengler suggests, backing separatist groups in Balochistan so as to weaken the Pakistani state itself. According to Spengler, this would force the Pakistani establishment to accede to the demands of Washington.

Both these two options are fraught with dangerous repercussions. The sensible option for America will be to compensate Pakistan for the losses it has suffered and look to prepare for a possible negotiated endgame in Afghanistan whereby America can withdraw under some peace offer. But considering the upcoming election fervor as well as the pre-dominance of irreconcilable and uncompromising exceptionalist attitudes in American polity, what is sensible to the rest of the World, might not be similar to the American leadership.

Note: “Blazing saddles in Pakistan” by Spengler (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MK29Df03.html)

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